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INTRODUCTION 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant Department of Workforce Services ("DWS") has 
cross-appealed in this matter, ostensibly challenging the lower court's order remanding 
certain issues to the Utah State Career Services Review Board for further determination 
(Court ruling of December 18, 2004, Rl 193-1195) - see Cross-Appellant's Docketing 
Statement herein. In its supporting brief, however, DWS raises only two issues on cross-
appeal, both jurisdictional in nature: Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this 
matter because the Career Services Review Board was not named as a party to the lower 
court's proceeding, and whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Appellant had 
filed no petition to amend or repeal administrative rules before filing suit. It is therefore 
to be understood, apparently, that if the trial court had jurisdiction of this case to begin 
with, DWS assigns no error to its ruling remanding its rule violations toward Appellant 
Lorin Blauer (hereafter "Mr. Blauer") for further proceedings before the Career Services 
Review Board. 
DWS's first issue on cross-appeal has already been fully briefed to, and disposed 
of by, this Court incident to DWS's motion for summary disposition herein. As already 
determined there, CSRB's absence as a party litigant in this action is not a fatal 
jurisdictional flaw. At worst, CSRB can still be added as a party under Rule 21, Utah R. 
Civ. P. 
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The suggestion that, prior to filing his petition for district court review of his 
demotion, Plaintiff/Appellant was required to petition for an amendment or appeal to 
administrative rules was never raised before the trial court. DWS submits as much in its 
brief, but suggests that this issue defeats the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, and 
may therefore be raised at any time. What DWS does not understand, though, is that 
Mr. Blauer makes no challenge to R477-l-l(32), but in fact relies on it to establish DWS' 
actions against him as a "demotion", as defined therein, as well as violative of the 
standards from prior decisions of this Court which went into the rule's formulation. 
DWS raises no substantial challenge to the impropriety of its actions in demoting 
Appellant - to the contrary, DWS admits that it was taking action against Appellant based 
on perceived performance deficiencies, clearly implying that he was moved from a job 
that he could not perform competently into a job which he could perform competently 
(even though, in fact, the reverse was the case due to Mr. Blauer's physical impairments, 
as DWS well knew). Yet because DWS held his pay and benefits level, DWS would have 
this court accept the proposition embraced by the lower court: that there was no demotion 
as a matter of law. The conclusion flies in the face of established case precedent before 
this Court, and the decision must be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Mr. Blauer disagrees with DWS's statement of jurisdiction, and asserts that 
jurisdiction in this matter arises under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
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ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In addition to the issues and standards identified in his opening brief, Mr. Blauer 
identifies the following additional issues raised by DWS on cross-appeal: 
1. Whether the lower court (and this Court, incident to DWS's Motion for 
Summary Disposition) erred in failing to find, as a matter of law, that by failing to join 
the Utah State Career Services Review Board as a party litigant in this action, Mr. Blauer 
deprived the trial court and this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
2. Whether Mr. Blauer5s appeal mounts an explicit or implicit challenge to an 
administrative rule; if so, whether Mr. Blauer's failure to petition the rulemaking agency 
before filing this action deprived the trial court and this Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
DWS's issues on cross-appeal are both jurisdictional in nature, and review is de 
novo. Case v. Case, 2004 UT App 423, Tj 5,103 P.3d 171. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Mr. Blauer relies upon the Statement of Determinative Case Law, and Statutory 
and Regulatory Provisions set out at p. 5 of in his opening brief. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Mr. Blauer relies upon his Statement of the Case set out at pp. 6-8 of his opening 
brief. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Blauer relies on the Statement of Facts set out at pp. 8-21 of his opening brief. 
In addition, Mr. Blauer responds as follows to the Statement of Facts set out at pages 8-14 
of DWS's brief: 
1. Concerning DWS's claim that Mr. Blauer's "reassignment" to a full-time 
administrative law judge was "temporary," the Court is invited to review Division 
Director Tani Downing's memorandum of September 9, 2003 (R. 454-456). There is 
nothing temporary about it - it is a move to a position with less responsibility, a lower pay 
range, and lesser qualifications, based on a series of claimed performance deficiencies as 
to which, to this day, Mr. Blauer has yet to be afforded a hearing. The letter itself is clear 
that "from now on" Mr. Blauer would be assigned to the duties of ALJ. Moreover, the 
fact that Mr. Blauer's "reassignment" to ALJ duties was accompanied by the hiring of 
Tiffany Vincent to fill his position (Blauer Affidavit, R. 406-487, at \ 24 and Exhibit 11) 
further belies its "temporary" nature. 
2. DWS continues to maintain that administrative law adjudication was one of 
the "core duties" of Mr. Blauer's position as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III. The Court 
is referred to Mr. Blauer's last position description questionnaire (R. 428), and paragraph 
14 of Mr. Blauer's Affidavit (R. 406-487). Nowhere is such duty specified as a core 
function of his position. Temporary assignment to Administrative Law Judge duties 
(which can only be categorized as part of the "special assignments" described therein) 
accounted for less than 10% of Mr. Blauer's official workload as defined by the 
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Department of Human Resource Management; all duties to the Workforce Appeals Board 
accounted for only 50% of his duties. 
3. According to DWS, Tani Downing had to reduce Mr. Blauer's workload 
and give it to others. The truth is another attorney was hired, and workload was shuffled 
and reassigned from everyone (not just Mr. Blauer), to the new attorney (Blauer 
Affidavit. R. 406-487, at f 24 and Exhibit 11). At the same time, the Board workload 
was increasing. This resulted in Mr. Blauer's Board cases increasing from 222 for fiscal 
year ending June 30, 2002, to 443 cases for fiscal year ending June 30, 2003 (Blauer 
Affidavit. R. 406-487, at f 16 and Exhibits 4 and 5). As noted above, Mr. Blauer's last 
PDQ dated April 2, 1998 (R. 406-487) shows the Board as 50% of his work assignments. 
But even with a doubling of the caseload Mr. Blauer was handing in that part of his 
assignments, Ms. Downing maintained he was not carrying his proportionate share of the 
workload - yet provided no substantive evidence to support her opinion (Blauer 
Affidavit. R. 406-487, at ^ 21 and Exhibit 9). In other words, not only was Mr. Blauer 
handling a Board workload that had doubled in the past year, Ms. Downing also assigned 
him to handle 40% of an ALJ caseload in addition to his duties including U.I. Information 
release, prosecution board and sub plans. Yet he faced an unsuccessful rating with no 
objective criteria against which his performance could be judged.1 
lMr. Blauer had not been furnished a performance plan for 2002 or 2003, as 
required by R477-10-1, Utah Admin. Code. 
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4. Concerning Ms. Downing's "unsuccessful" performance appraisal and Mr. 
Blauer's successful challenge thereto, DWS fails to address the shortcomings of the 
appraisal report. In fact, the appraisal contained gross errors regarding Mr. Blauer's 
supposed failure to meet "red letter dates" on the cases he heard beginning March 26, 
2003. Mr. Blauer noted those errors in his Response/Grievance (R. 432-435).2 Ms. 
Downing acknowledged the errors in her response (R. 452),3 but refused to reconsider her 
unsuccessful review. 
5. Concerning DWS's allegations of poor performance on his part, Mr. Blauer 
reminds the Court that he has never had the opportunity to face or refute these charges -
the very purpose of an administrative grievance proceeding culminating in a hearing 
before the Career Services Review Board. Instead, CSRB (and then the lower court) 
2On page 2 of his Response/Grievance, Mr. Blauer noted that his ".. .appeal rate to 
the Workforce Appeals Board on cases I handled as an ALJ has been nearly half the rate 
of the Appeals unit as a whole. If the Appeals unit as a whole had my appeal rate, the 
Board's workload would have been cut nearly in half during the period that it had, 
instead, doubled." He further noted that".. .the quality of decisions written for the Board 
remains high with an appeal rate of less than 5% to the Court of Appeals, and no reversals 
by the Court of Appeals. I am now handling nearly triple the Board caseload over the 
1998 figures when the Board was 50% of my workload." R. 432-435. 
3In her July 25, 2003 Response to Grievance R. 452), Ms. Downing stated: "I 
acknowledge that you have a low appeal rate, not only to the Workforce Appeals Board, 
but to the Court of Appeals. Your 20 plus years' experience in your job would have 
enabled you to achieve this." She did not, however, respond to Mr. Blauer's factual data 
showing that his Board workload had doubled, in addition to his other assignments 
including a 40% ALJ workload. She simply continued to contend he was not handling his 
fair share of the workload; however without providing a shred of factual data to support 
her contention. 
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determined that, even though DWS acknowledged having "reassigned" Mr. Blauer to the 
responsibility of Administrative Law Judge-Non- Juris Doctorate, as a "corrective action" 
for performance deficiencies (R. 454-456; 727-840), it was not a "demotion" over which 
the CSRB could exercise jurisdiction. The whole purpose of this appeal is to compel a 
forum to address DWS's performance charges, and to permit Mr. Blauer to confront 
them.4 
4
 Particularly egregious are Ms. Downing's groundless charges that, as 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, Mr. Blauer engaged in conduct violative of his 
professional obligations as a member of the Utah State Bar. Mr. Blauer has proceeded 
through all administrative grievance levels, through a proceeding before the lower court, 
and now stands before the Court of Appeals, having never had the opportunity to belie 
these outrageous charges. To cite three examples: 
1. Ms. Downing actually accused Mr. Blauer of "plagiarism" in quoting from 
briefs of counsel in the opinions which he authored - a charge fully 
addressed in his appraisal response (R. 432-435), yet never withdrawn; 
2. Ms. Downing groundlessly accused Mr. Blauer of permitting use of a stamp 
to sign his name to submittals which he had not read, in violation of Rule 
11, Utah R. Civ. P. - yet no proof of such conduct has ever been adduced. 
3. Ms. Downing's allegation that Mr. Blauer did not strictly comply with 
Subsection 35A-4-312(6), because she had not found anyone who could 
remember the risk analysis required by that subsection is, particularly 
outrageous. Mr. Blauer represented the Department on the state committee 
that drafted GRAMA. He was primarily responsible for the drafting of the 
Department rule that was subsequently codified into Section 35A4-312. 
Subsection 35A-4-312(6) is also set forth below. Mr. Blauer was assigned 
by Ms. Downing's predecessor, Allen Zabel, to make the risk analysis that 
Ms. Downing accuses Mr. Blauer of not making. Mr. Blauer made that 
analysis himself, and only raised the issue with others if he saw a problem. 
In most instances when he did raise it, it was with John Levanger, Internal 
Audit Manager with responsibility over the release of Department records. 
Mr. Blauer was his legal counsel on these issues. 
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6. With respect to DWS's claim, at p. 10 of its brief, that Ms. Downing 
". . . discovered serious professional lapses by Blauer in his handling of Unemployment 
compensation collections," it is noted that Ms. Downing's September 9,2003 
memorandum (R. 454-456) supposedly itemizing these professional lapses and using 
them as justification to move Mr. Blauer from the duties of Legal/Enforcement Counsel 
III (steps 63-78) to Administrative Law Judge-Non Juris Doctorate (steps 51-66) failed 
outright to comply with the requirements of R477-10-2.(1) and (2). The record is devoid 
of any evidence that Ms. Downing ever discussed with Mr. Blauer his alleged 
substandard performance as set forth in that memorandum, as required by law. Had she 
done so, she would have learned that her accusations were much worse than simply 
inaccurate. 
7. DWS clearly attempts to characterize its demotion of Mr. Blauer as an 
attempt at "reasonable accommodation" under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 
1993. The suggestion is preposterous, for several reasons: 
a. Mr. Blauer's "reassignment" was, by the express terms of Ms. 
Downing's September 2003 memorandum, a "corrective action" - not a "reasonable 
accommodation" (R. 454-456); 
b. Prior to the demotion, Mr. Blauer had expressly notified DWS that, 
due to health problems, he had difficulty performing the responsibilities of an 
Administrative Law Judge (Affidavit of Lorin Blauer, R.406-487, at | 25 and Exhibits 
12-15); 
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c. Mr. Blauer's administrative representative, Tom Cantrell, attempted 
to intercede on Mr. Blauer's behalf with DWS's ADA coordinator, Chuck Butler, who 
was openly scornful of Mr. Blauer's disability claim, actually accusing Mr. Blauer of 
falsifying medical information in support of his claim. (Affidavit of Tom Cantrell, R. 
398-405, at f 4-10; 12-18.) Mr. Butler expressly characterized Mr. Blauer as nothing but 
a "slacker." Id. 
8. At p. 11 of its brief, DWS mischaracterizes the recommendations of his 
doctors regarding how long he could sit. In his July 26, 2003 letter to DWS's ADA 
Coordinator Chuck Butler (R. 464-466), Dr. Dennis R. Peterson stated with respect to his 
functional limitations: 
Sciatica - Sitting for any period at all (when sciatica is active) or for more than an 
hour (when it is at its best) induces lancinating pain which is very distracting and 
degrades attention, concentration, and creativity. 
Any misunderstanding which DWS might claim regarding the recommendations of Mr. 
Blauer's doctors should have been cleared up by their subsequent letters. In a letter dated 
September 23, 2003 (R. 469), Dr. Perry J. Lofthouse (who treated Mr. Blauer's sciatica) 
stated: 
He informed me of his new job assignment effective September 9th—reporting a 
caseload increase involving lengthy sessions of sitting... I examined Blauer today 
for treatment of backache and inflamed sciatic. 
I thought I was clear that Mr. Blauer needs to have physical mobility - no sitting 
or standing in place for longer than 20 minutes at a time without moving about for 
at least 5 to 10 minutes. 
In a letter dated November 6, 2003 (R. 352), Dr. Peterson stated the following: 
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In order to accommodate his sciatica, Lorin should do no more than two 
hearings a week (or similar limitation of duties that require him to sit or 
stand for extended periods of time); but he must take an ambulatory break 
every 40 minutes at minimum...In order to accommodate his coronary 
condition and other medical issues that can be exacerbated by undue stress, 
Lorin should be insulated from the current management style of Tani 
Downing...I have repeatedly stated that Lorin can perform his traditional-or 
similar-duties with these accommodations...I recommend that he be placed 
on FMLA sick leave, not because he couldn't work, but to protect his health 
because of the letters from the Department revealing that they were forcing 
him to perform a combination of duties that I specifically advised against 
under conditions that were unnecessarily stressful. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
Given the clear directives from Mr. Blauer's attending healthcare providers, 
DWS's inference that it was somehow a "positive" that Ms. Downing ".. .did not assign 
him to another supervisor" (opposing brief at p. 12) can only be seen as perverse. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Blauer's non-joinder of the Utah State Career Services Review Board as a 
party litigant in this action is not fatal to the trial court's jurisdiction, or to this Court's 
jurisdiction on appeal. A proper reading of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46d-14, which requires 
joinder of "the agency" as a "respondent" in a petition for review of an adjudicative 
proceeding, contemplates joinder of the agency taking action against the petitioner - not 
the Utah State Career Services Review Board, which is properly defined by statute as a 
"superior agency" (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(l)Q)- In addition, if the CSRB's absence 
from this action is deemed problematic, it can still be joined as a party defendant under 
Rule 21, Utah R. Civ. P. 
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DWS's second claim, that Mr. Blauer should have petitioned for repeal of R477-1-
1(32), Utah Admin. Code, before filing this action, ignores the fact that Mr. Blauer has 
never sought repeal of that provision, either expressly or by implication. To the contrary, 
Mr. Blauer recognizes the amendments to the rule as reflective of governing case law, and 
contends that DWS violated both the rule and supporting case law in his demotion. 
DWS has failed to dislodge the fact that its actions against Mr. Blauer constituted a 
"demotion" within the meaning of both the applicable regulatory provision and governing 
case law in the form of Draughon v. Utah Dept. of Financial Institutions, 1999 UT App. 
42, 975 P.2d 935. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. BLAUER'S NON-JOINDER OF UTAH STATE CAREER 
SERVICES REVIEW BOARD AS A PARTY DEFENDANT BEFORE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DEPRIVE THAT COURT, OR THIS 
COURT, OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. 
At Point I of its Argument, DWS again visits the question of whether Mr. Blauer's 
failure to include the Utah State Career Services Review Board as a named party 
defendant deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. This issue was the 
substance of DWS's Motion for Summary Disposition in this matter; Mr. Blauer 
addressed the argument at that time, and the Court denied the motion. 
The Utah legislature has set out the scope of this Court's jurisdiction at Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3. Pursuant to subsection 2(a) thereof, this court is expressly granted 
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exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies . . ." Appellant in this matter takes his 
appeal from a review, by the Third Judicial District Court, of an informal adjudicative 
proceeding before the Career Services Review Board ("CSRB"), involving DWS's 
constructive termination of his employment. Procedurally, the matter falls squarely 
within this Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
DWS, however, claims that none of this matters. According to DWS, the fact that 
CSRB was not joined in this action (even though Appellant joined DWS as the "agency" 
which the statute expressly defines as the proper "respondent"), this entire proceeding is 
jurisdictionally deficient and must be dismissed on summary disposition. In support of 
this proposition, DWS cites to a handful of reported decisions involving appeals from 
CSRB decisions, and invokes the language of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46d-14. These will 
be dealt with in turn. 
1. With respect, first, to DWS's cited case authority, not a single cited case 
has held that failure to join CSRB constitutes a jurisdictional defect. The cited cases, in 
fact, have nothing whatsoever to do with the substance of this appeal in general, or of 
DWS's motion in particular, save that, in each case, CSRB was joined as a respondent. 
The fact that CSRB is a proper or permissible party, however, does not equate to the 
proposition that its joinder is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Such a condition would of 
necessity have to arise from the enabling statute - which it simply does not. 
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2. Plaintiff acknowledges that, under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46d-14, a petition 
for judicial review of informal agency proceedings provides that a petition for judicial 
review "shall join the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents" (emphasis 
added). DWS fails to note, however, that (1) both the term "agency" and the term 
"respondent" are defined terms in the statute, and (2) a reasonable joint reading of those 
definitions points to joinder of DWS as the proper "respondent" in the action. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(l)(b), the term "agency" is broadly defined: 
"Agency" means a board, commission, department, division, officer, 
council, office, committee, bureau, or other administrative unit of this state, 
including the agency head, agency employees, or other persons acting on 
behalf of or under the authority of the agency head, but does not mean the 
Legislature, the courts, the governor, any political subdivision of the state, 
or any administrative unit of a political subdivision of the state. 
"Agency," then, is broadly defined by the statute, and would include DWS as well as 
CSRB. 
"Respondent," however, is far more narrowly defined: 
"Respondent" means a person against whom an adjudicative proceeding is 
initiated, whether by an agency or any other person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(l)(i) (emphasis added).5 Any reasonable joint reading of 
these definitional provisions leads to the conclusion that the appropriate "agency" to join 
as the "respondent" is the "person" against whom Appellant initiated the adjudicative 
proceeding before the CSRB, not CSRB itself. In electing to bring his action against 
5The term "person" includes, if applicable, an "agency" - Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-2(g). 
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DWS, then, Appellant sued the entity which it is identified, under the statute, as the 
"respondent," as well as the "agency," involved in the proceeding, for purposes of § 63-
46b-14(3)(a). DWS's argument, without benefit of further clarifying language in the 
statute or interpretive case law, that Appellant's approach in this regard created a fatal 
jurisdictional flaw, is simply untenable. 
DWS's argument that CSRB - the administrative tribunal from which Appellant's 
petition against DWS was taken - was the only correct, indispensable "agency" under the 
Act, also overlooks the fact that CSRB's role in the administrative proceedings in this 
matter brings it within another defined term under the Act - that of a "superior agency": 
"Superior agency" means an agency required or authorized by law to review 
the orders of another agency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(l)(j). The Act, in other words, makes a distinction between 
the agency or other person taking action against the petitioner - the "respondent" — and 
another agency authorized by law to review the orders of that person if it is an agency - a 
"superior agency." CSRB acted as a "superior agency" in its review of DWS's actions, 
pursuant to Mr. Blauer's grievance. Had the legislature intended to make joinder of the 
"superior agency" a jurisdictional prerequisite to seeking judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings, it could have said so. It did not. DWS's interpretation of the 
Act under these circumstances is unduly restrictive, and in derogation of the Legislature's 
broad grant of jurisdiction to this Court to hear appeals from judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
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In short, DWS invites this Court to create a limitation on the Legislature's broad 
grant of jurisdiction to review lower courts' rulings on informal adjudicative proceedings, 
supported neither by clear statutory mandate or any applicable decisions. 
Given the foregoing, DWS's final leap of logic - that the trial court was powerless 
to reverse CSRB's determination that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Blauer's grievance is 
void because he did not have "personal jurisdiction" over CSRB - fails outright. Mr. 
Blauer's petition to the trial court was for review of CSRB's decision - precisely as Mr. 
Blauer's petition to this Court was for review of the trial court's decision. The CSRB, 
as a "superior agency" under the statute, is an administrative tribunal, the ruling of which 
was under consideration by the trial court pursuant to statute - not a private party litigant 
whose actions can not be compelled without the service of Summons and Complaint. The 
trial court determined that CSRB's administrator had made legal error in declining 
jurisdiction over Mr. Blauer's grievance. The lower court no more lacked jurisdictional 
competence to fashion an appropriate remedy under the circumstances than does this 
Court to reverse the trial court's determination that Mr. Blauer was not demoted without 
joining the trial court as a party defendant in this appeal. 
As a final note, if DWS continues to be agitated by CSRB's absence from these 
proceedings, CSRB can still be added. Rule 21, Utah R. Civ. P. is emphatic that 
"[misjoinder of parties is not grounds for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped 
or added by order of the court on motion of any party of its own initiative at any stage of 
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the action and on such terms as are just." Joinder could be accomplished on remand, if 
this Court deems it necessary to full and proper relief. 
POINT II 
MR. BLAUER'S PETITION TO THE TRIAL COURT, LIKE HIS 
APPEAL TO THIS COURT, MAKES NO ATTEMPT TO 
OVERTURN RULE 4774(32) OF THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE 
CODE; AS SUCH, HIS FAILURE TO PETITION FOR 
REVOCATION OF THAT RULE DOES NOT DEPRIVE THIS 
COURT OF JURISDICTION. 
DWS's second argument is a complete mystery. It seems to suggest that, by citing 
this Court to the case ofDraughon v. Utah Dept. of Financial Institutions, 1999 UT App. 
42, 975 P.2d 935, Mr. Blauer has somehow mounted a challenge to the validity of Rule 
477-1(32), Utah Admin. Code; further, that since that challenge was not preceded by a 
petition to the Department of Human Resources to Repeal R477-l(32), this entire 
proceeding is jurisdictionally deficient. 
The Court need do no more than review Mr. Blauer's opening brief, which 
nowhere challenges the validity of the cited rule, or argues its repeal. To the contrary, the 
cited provision defines DWS's conduct toward Mr. Blauer as a "demotion," in full 
conformity to the Draughon decision. See R378-387; opening brief at pp. 4, 23, 31, 32, 
38. 
As more fully set out in his opening brief, and at Point II below, Mr. Blauer argues 
that, under the standard established by R477-l-l(32), Utah Admin. Code, DWS's actions 
against him constituted a "demotion" in that it was a change of an incumbent from one 
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position to another having a lower salary range (whether or not it entailed a change in job 
title, or a reduction in salary). Like the Draughon decision giving rise to it, the cited rule 
can sustain no other conclusion. Mr. Blauer does not challenge its validity, or seek its 
repeal, and is under no mandate to petition the Department of Human Resource 
Management before filing suit. 
POINT III 
MR. BLAUER WAS DEMOTED, AND ENTITLED TO A HEARING 
BEFORE THE CSRB. 
DWS's opposing brief does nothing to dislodge the fact that, as corrective action 
against him (and in the wake of a superior overruling her "unsuccessful" performance 
evaluation), Tani Downing demoted Mr. Blauer for perceived performance deficiencies 
(albeit groundless and as yet unchallenged) by moving him from a position which he had 
performed for many years to one in which he could not effectively function due to 
physical limitations; a position defined, by DHRM regulations, as one having a salary step 
and pay range as significantly lower than that which he had previously occupied. Both 
the CSRB and the lower court completely ignored the language of Draughon and R477-1-
1(32), concluding that since Mr. Blauer had lost no salary or benefits, he had not been 
"demoted." For those reasons set out in Mr. Blauer's opening brief, the position is simply 
untenable. 
In an attempt to sidestep the inevitable consequences of its action, DWS takes 
completely inconsistent positions. Its opposing brief attempts to characterize the 
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demotion as nothing but a "temporary" "reassignment" - a position nowhere supported by 
the record. It attempts to argue that the "reassignment" was for Mr. Blauer's own good -
again ignoring the facts that (1) Ms. Downing was motivated by claims of performance 
deficiencies on Mr. Blauer's part, which she now seeks to avoid having to address in an 
adjudicative proceeding; (2) the "reassignment" was to a position which, as DWS well 
knew, Mr. Blauer was physically incapable of performing; and (3) DWS's ADA 
representative was openly scornful of Mr. Blauer's claims of disability. Why, if Mr. 
Blauer was the hopeless maladroit characterized in Ms. Downing's affidavit, would the 
"reassignment" to function of an ALJ be "temporary"? How, in light of medical 
documentation in DWS's possession at the time of "reassignment" could Ms. Downing's 
actions possibly increase Mr. Blauer's well-being or utility to his employer? How, given 
the internal inconsistencies in DWS's own story behind the "reassignment" (to say 
nothing of the challenges thereto contained in Mr. Blauer's submittals) could CSRB and 
the lower court validly determine that, as a matter of law, there had been no "demotion," 
and therefore no jurisdiction? 
At p. 27 of its Brief, DWS mischaracterizes the requirements of Rule 477-1(32) 
when it states " . . . the requirement of a formal change in position to a lower salary range 
before the grievance process may be invoked is not only reasonable, but entirely 
consistent with legislative intent." The rule (set forth on pages 4, 23, and 38 of 
Appellant's Brief) does not require a "formal change" "to a lower salary range." The rule 
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requires only "An action resulting in . . . the movement of an incumbent from one job or 
position to another job or position having a lower salary range. . . . " 
If DWS truly accepts that "Rule 477-1(32), unlike its predecessor, creates broad 
access to the grievance process without undue interference in managerial discretion" 
(opposing brief at p. 26) why is it so desperate to deny Mr. Blauer a hearing on his 
adverse action, clearly intended to be a demotion or corrective action? Tani Downing 
demoted Mr. Blauer without giving him the basic due process right of an opportunity to 
rebut the charges she cited in her demotion memorandum as grounds for the demotion. 
That denial has continued on now for nearly two years. During this time DWS has 
refused to allow him to perform the duties his doctors have certified he can perform, and 
has insisted it will only allow him to perform the duties his doctors have certified he 
cannot safely perform. 
Somewhere, DWS needs to be held accountable for its action toward Mr. Blauer. 
It is possible that upon hearing the merits, CSRB will determine that DWS's action was 
justified. To find, however, that jurisdiction was lacking as a matter of law, and that no 
facts existed raising a reasonable question whether a demotion had in fact occurred under 
applicable regulatory and case law, was clearly reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
For those reasons set out above, as well as those in his opening brief, Mr. Blauer 
submits that the trial court's dismissal of his claims based on demotion should be 
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reversed, while its remand of all remaining issues for further consideration by the Utah 
State Career Services Review Board should be affirmed. 
DATED this 17th day of June, 2005. , 
JONES, WALDO, HQLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
y i 
""Vincent C. Ramp ton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Lorin Blauer 
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